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The Fiscal Covenant
in Guatemala:
lessons learned from the
negotiations
Juan Alberto Fuentes K. and Maynor Cabrera
Guatemala’s recent experience in negotiating a fiscal covenant,
together with other efforts –some more successful than others– to achieve
social covenants on fiscal policy, may serve as a lesson or suggest key
elements for a fiscal covenant. This article analyses the Guatemalan
experience in the light of the main determining factors of a number of
successful or failed fiscal covenants in countries as diverse as Chile,
Indonesia, Poland, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United Kingdom
and the United States. In conclusion, the authors identify 10 key
components of a successful fiscal covenant, based on Guatemala’s
experience and that of the other countries mentioned above.
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I
The institutional framework of Guatemalan
fiscal policy prior to the adoption
of the Fiscal Covenant of 2000
Successive governments throughout Guatemala’s
history have been obliged to undertake tax reforms to
deal with the inherent weakness of the country’s public
finances. It would seem that each administration has
“discovered” this weakness and attempted to resolve
it without fully understanding its nature or the major
challenges that it raises. These initiatives have come
up against very strong and well-organized interest
groups, united in a confederation of business chambers,
the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural,
Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations of
Guatemala (CACIF), which has generally had direct
access to the Executive and has been able to wield
considerable influence over tax policy.1  The direct
and institutionally unmediated relationship between
the economic powers and the Executive has taken two
forms: (i) negotiation by elites, which has been reflected
in a few minor tax reforms agreed between a
technocratic elite and a business elite; or (ii)
confrontation, a situation in which the private sector
has resorted to lockouts, mobilization of public
opinion through the media or the filing of complaints
of unconstitutionality to invalidate by legal means
possible increases in taxes.
Some articles of the 1985 Constitution weakened
the position of the fiscal authorities and strengthened
that of taxpayers. For example, a taxpayer wishing to
contest tax resolutions cannot be required to pay the
tax in advance, and the fines and interest on arrears
must not exceed the value of the unpaid or overdue
tax, since the Constitution deems this to be confiscatory.
According to ECLAC, these clauses reflect the fact that
in Guatemala, property rights are mixed with tax
obligations, which does not occur in other countries
such as El Salvador or Costa Rica.2  Furthermore, the
Constitution prohibits double taxation in very vague
1 See McCleary (1999, p.108), Valdez (2000, p.12), Martí and
Ortiz (1993), Valdez and Palencia (1998), Urrutia (2000) and
Palencia (2002).
2 For a comparative analysis, see ECLAC (1996).
terms, which has given rise to multiple interpretations
of this clause so that it is difficult to determine whether
tax reforms adopted by Congress are applicable or not.
The Constitution also allows any citizen or
company, with the assistance of three lawyers, to file a
complaint before the Constitutional Court –the highest
court on matters relating to the Constitution of
Guatemala– which may, if it considers that a law
infringes any constitutional right, declare it invalid.
According to ECLAC, this means that the negotiation of
taxes is tantamount to a “direct negotiation between
the State and the propertied classes”, whereas in other
countries, such as Costa Rica or El Salvador, it is in the
Congress and in the political arena that the tax
authority of the State is defined (ECLAC, 1996).
Consequently, tax negotiations are not
concentrated principally on the approval of legislation
by Congress, since such approval can be changed
relatively easily by the Constitutional Court if a
complaint of unconstitutionality is filed. In this new
context, governments may be faced with a reduction
of their financial resources when least expected, as
occurred in 1994, when the tax burden was reduced by
1% of GDP because a tax law was declared
unconstitutional.
Table 1 lists the various initiatives launched
between the 1980s and the year 2000 (when the Fiscal
Covenant for a Future of Peace and Development was
signed), together with the private sector’s response and
the final outcome of the initiative. Three conclusions
are evident. First, situations of confrontation
predominated, with CACIF asserting its “veto power”
through lockouts, denunciation campaigns in the
media, and the filing of complaints of unconstitutionality
(which occurred irrespective of the type of government:
regardless of whether it was military or civil and whether
it had a majority in Congress or not).
When negotiations did take place, they took the
form of “elite negotiations” between a technocratic
elite and business leaders; the real forum for
negotiations was not the democratic institutions of the
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TABLE 1
Guatemala: Summary of tax reforms and their results, 1980-1999
Government and Government Form of action Outcome Change in
year of reform proposals used by CACIF tax burden
Democratic regimes with internal armed conflict
Cases of negotiation by elites
Democratic regimes with armed conflicts
Cases of confrontation
Military regime with internal armed conflict
Democratic regimes with Peace Accords
Jorge Serrano (1992) Reduction of marginal income
tax brackets and ceilings
Simplification of VAT




Adoption of reforms 0.5%
(between 1991 and 1993)
10% value added tax (VAT)




Support of the Chamber of
Commerce for VAT in
exchange for non- approval
of the regulations on
customs valuation and the
luxury tax.
Anti-tax campaigns in the
media




(between 1982 and 1984)
Ríos Montt (1983)
Mejía Victores (1985) Reduction of VAT to 7%
Tax on coffee
Expansion of the VAT base






Dismissal of the ministers
of the economy and public
finance
1.7%
(between 1984 and 1986
Vinicio Cerezo (1987) Temporary tax on exports




through lockouts and filing
of complaints of
unconstitutionality
Temporary tax on exports
not approved.
Reforms to income tax, VAT
and property tax declared
unconstitutional
1.7%
(between 1986 and 1988)
Ramiro de León (1994) Changes in income tax
Equalization of rates of
specific taxes (on beverages,
petroleum derivatives and
tobacco) with those applied by
other Central American
countries.
Increase of VAT to 10%
Opposition to measures




Increase in VAT (1996) 1.6%
(between 1993 and 1996)
Alvaro Arzú (1996-1998) Reduction of income tax rate
Simplification of VAT
Elimination of exemptions
Temporary taxes on sales and
assets (1996 and 1998)
Negotiations without other
actions
Adoption of reforms 0.4%
(between 1996 and 1998)
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Valdez and Palencia (1998), Urrutia (2000) and McCleary (1999) and data from
the Ministry of Public Finance.
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country, and much less the National Congress. Lastly,
when such elite negotiations took place, the proposals
which succeeded in gaining acceptance were those
aimed at simplifying the tax system or increasing VAT
and eroding direct taxation (even through the
application of temporary taxes) at a time when there
has been pressure to increase it. As may be seen from
box 1, the involvement of the main actors and the styles
of negotiation adopted have been important in
international experiences.
Thus, the main features of fiscal policy in
Guatemala prior to the signing of the Fiscal Covenant
in 2000 were as follows: low tax income and limited
allocations for social spending, deficiencies in the
management of this expenditure (lack of technical
instruments for measuring the quality of expenditure),
and a high concentration of expenditure in the central
region of the country.3  This helps to explain why
Guatemala is lagging furthest behind the rest of Latin
America in terms of social indicators.
3 For a more detailed description, see SNU (2001, pp. 3-36 and
125-178).
Box 1
FISCAL REFORM: ACTORS AND STYLES OF NEGOTIATION AS FACTORS OF SUCCESS
In Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, the legislative power and the main political parties arrived
at agreements within a clear and stable framework of rules. Thanks to this framework, shifts in the correlation of
forces could give rise to new policies without altering the basic rules of the game, while at the same time the
institutional framework moderated the initiatives and strength of employers’ associations and labour unions,
particularly in Sweden and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the Executive, with its solid capacity for tax
collection and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by its technocrats, ensured that reforms could be properly
implemented.
In Chile, there was a process of consultation with labour sectors and the position of Chilean business leaders
was taken into account in the formulation of reform proposals, but these were negotiated directly between the
ruling Democratic Coalition and Renovación Nacional, the main opposition party (Boylan, 1996). At the same
time, the Ministry of Finance’s capacity for revenue collection and its technical and political independence did not
leave any doubt as to its ability to implement proposed reforms.
In Poland, the government encouraged negotiations between workers and the State and these culminated in
the signing of a social covenant covering both the question of wages –agreed through a tripartite committee of
managers, government and workers– and tax policy, which was then ratified by the legislative body.
The Russian Government settled for negotiations with elites, which were a far cry from the collective
bargaining that took place in Poland. In particular, the government arranged informal negotiations with (i)
regional governors, giving rise to bilateral agreements on the division of revenues between the central government
and local governments; (ii) managers of State-owned enterprises producing raw materials for export, which were
the main sources of revenue, and (iii) entrepreneurs of the financial sector, who became the principal sources of
credit for the government as well as administrators of State resources. These negotiations did not lead to lasting
agreements.
Another experience with fiscal reform, which was hailed as a success at the time, was that of Indonesia,
although in this case there was no democratic institutional framework to mediate between the pressures of
different groups, owing to the dictatorial nature of the regime of President Suharto, who was Indonesia’s Head
of State for 30 years. This allowed a small group of national experts, with international advice, to establish a vast
set of measures which included the introduction of a value added tax, the simplification and strengthening of
income tax, and the streamlining of other laws to facilitate the tax administration but which lacked broad-based
political and social support.
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II
Negotiation of the Fiscal Covenant in Guatemala
(IEMA); the reduction of the extent to which payments
of VAT could be credited against income tax; redrafting
of the property tax; and measures to improve tax
collection, such as the hiring of auditing companies to
check foreign trade transactions.
What subsequently proved to be most important,
however, was the government’s additional commitment
to take steps towards the signing of a fiscal covenant
to promote concerted tax reform, create a new tax
culture and strengthen the capacity for managing fiscal
policy.5  The idea of a fiscal covenant –inspired partly
by the ECLAC book of the same name (ECLAC, 1998)– was
above all a response to a long history of failed tax
reforms promoted in confrontational situations in
which, as already explained, complaints of
unconstitutionality, lockouts and massive media
campaigns were used to stave off the implementation
of proposed tax reforms,.
The idea of promoting a fiscal covenant was based
on the assumption that tax reform would only be
sustainable if it was supported by consensus (in other
words, if tax compliance were practically voluntary),
in order to protect it against the forcible measures taken
by various trade union or political entities. This called
for a new institutional framework which would prevent
individual social forces from exercising a power of veto
and would thus be consistent with the existence of
true democracy.6
2. The negotiation of the Fiscal Covenant:
an attempt to create a new institutional
framework
(a) The Fiscal Covenant as a global agreement
Negotiation of the Fiscal Covenant was started at
the initiative of the members of the Committee to
Monitor the Fulfilment of the Peace Accords. This
Peace Committee was composed of representatives of
the government, of the political party representing the
1. Factors behind the emergence
of the Fiscal Covenant
After more than 30 years of internal armed conflict and
a long-drawn-out negotiation process, Peace Accords
were signed in Guatemala in 1996. The end of the war,
together with the commitments contained in those
Accords, raised the expectations of citizens and of the
government itself, by establishing a political covenant
providing for the minimum basic understandings
required for the construction of a new country. The
Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and the
Agrarian Situation (ASESA), which was one of the most
important of the set of Peace Accords, stated that by
the year 2000 the tax burden should be at least 50%
higher than in 1995 in order to provide financing for
the programmes and projects designed to consolidate
the peace process.
The agreements signed provided for a 50%
increase in public spending on education and health
(as a proportion of GDP) between 1996 and 2000, as
well as other targets for increased expenditure on
housing and justice, together with a moderate
reduction in military spending. The Peace Accords also
stated that the United Nations would be responsible
for monitoring the fulfilment of these goals.
By the end of the 1990s, tax collection figures
showed that the target of a tax burden of 12% of GDP in
2000 (compared with approximately 8% of GDP in the
mid-1990s) was not going to be met.4  Recognizing
this fact, the Guatemalan Government advocated
modification of the timetable for reaching the targets
established in the Peace Accords, postponing until 2002
the date for achieving the tax target. As part of the
negotiations to secure agreement on this modification,
the government pledged to push forward various tax
laws, which included the establishment of an income-
tax-deductible tax on sales and assets, known as the
tax on commercial and agricultural establishments
4 The revision scheduled of the national accounts in Guatemala
may alter these proportions of the tax burden (8%, 10% or
12%), but this does not detract from the original ASESA
agreement, which established the need to increase the tax burden
by 50% over the 1996 level.
5 For a description of the relationship between the Fiscal Covenant
and the Peace Accords, see Noriega, Alvarez and Chocoj (2001).
6 Rosenthal (2005) highlights the importance of this condition in
the Guatemalan context.
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former insurgent forces, Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity (URNG), eminent citizens identified
as representatives of civil society, and United Nations
representatives with observer status.
As a first step, the Committee appointed a
commission, entitled the Preparatory Commission for
the Fiscal Covenant (CPPF), to prepare –in consultation
with representatives of different sectors of Guatemalan
society– a proposal for the adoption of the fiscal
covenant based on technical studies. This Preparatory
Commission gave technical and political credibility
to the process, since its members, as well as having a
broad-based store of knowledge on fiscal issues,
constituted a pluralistic group representing the different
perspectives on the fiscal question in Guatemala, and
some were closely related with the main political parties
of the time.7
Despite the fact that the preparatory process of the
Fiscal Covenant took place during an election year, an
intensive series of consultations was held with different
sectors (the academic world, the private sector, trade
unions, the cooperative sector and political parties)
from all over the country, and the media gave broad
and positive coverage to the issue; solid technical
support was also provided by international cooperation
agencies,8  which was extended to various academic
and social organizations, thereby publicising the issue
and contributing to extensive debates on it during the
year. This culminated in the proposal for a Fiscal
Covenant, which was presented publicly by the
Preparatory Commission on 29 December 1999. This
proposal had two features: (i) it took an integral
approach, since it referred not only to tax reform but
also to the whole area of public finances: public
expenditure, tax administration, debt, deficit, public
assets, transparency and decentralization; and (ii) it
was oriented towards principles and commitments, with
a medium- and long-term view, instead of being centred
exclusively on short-term measures.
In February 2000, the Peace Committee sent out
an invitation to take part in consultations on the
proposal prepared by the Preparatory Commission to
nearly 150 organizations and institutions of different
types: trade unions and representatives, small and
medium-sized enterprises, business chambers,
cooperatives, churches, non-governmental
organizations, peasant, indigenous and women’s
organizations, universities and research centres. In
response, 48 proposals were received, representing 131
organizations. On the basis of these proposals, a
technical team appointed by the Committee to Monitor
the Fulfilment of the Peace Accords identified the main
points of consensus and dissent. The Committee then
carried out a campaign to reconcile positions between
the organized business sector and social organizations.
After a period of dialogue and negotiation, two different
positions took shape with regard to the various issues.
After this campaign and the holding of the National
Forum on the Fiscal Covenant, which brought together
the organizations that had sent in proposals, final
agreement was reached and the Fiscal Covenant was
signed by more than 100 organizations, as well as by
the representatives of the three State powers. On the
whole, while there were lengthy negotiations on some
sensitive issues, such as the progressiveness of the tax
measures, the use to be made of the proceeds of
privatization operations, and the constitutional
reforms, most of the proposals made originally by the
Preparatory Commission were respected and the same
structure based on the establishment of principles and
commitments for the whole set of public finance issues
was maintained.
Gamboa and Tentravizi (2001, pp. 131-139) point
out that the agreement finally reached on the Fiscal
Covenant, which in the past had aroused a great deal
of controversy, was largely due to factors such as the
characteristics of the Preparatory Commission (its
representativeness and high technical level), the
identification of principles and commitments geared
to the medium and long term instead of discussions on
tax measures, and the existence of a single document
as the basis for the debate. Other positive factors
included the favourable framework provided by the
Peace Accords, the unity displayed by the social
organizations, which constituted to some degree a
counterweight to CACIF, a flexible negotiation method,
which took advantage of the experience gained in
negotiating the Peace Accords, and a collective
learning process which gave some flexibility or fluidity
to the positions of the participants, facilitating
convergence among them. In practice, this represented
the entry of new actors into the discussion of an issue
which had traditionally been the subject of
7 According to Gamboa and Tentravizi (2000, pp. 53-72), the
membership of CPPF was fairly well-balanced, as it consisted of
representatives of left-wing and moderate right-wing positions,
the main economic advisors of the government party, and
members of the leading opposition party.
8 For the studies which served as the basis for the proposal of
the Fiscal Covenant, see Preparatory Commission for the Fiscal
Covenant (2000).
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negotiations within a small group of senior government
officials and private-sector representatives.
During this preparatory and negotiation stage, the
two governments in power (the first from 1996-1999
and the second from 2000-2003) strongly supported
the formulation and discussion of the Fiscal Covenant,
albeit without playing a leading role. For its part, the
business sector was in agreement with this process,
partly because of its fear of the Guatemalan Republican
Front (GRF). This political party had won the elections
in 1999 with a populist, anti-business discourse, and
entrepreneurs therefore viewed the Fiscal Covenant as
potentially useful for defining a framework of rules
that would provide a certain degree of stability and
transparency to govern the role of the new
administration and its relations with other sectors
(Segovia, 2004, p.64).
This may be interpreted as the change in the
correlation of forces which has favoured the negotiation
of fiscal covenants in other circumstances, as shown in
box 2. It should be recognized, however, that the
perspective of a change of government every four years
and the need for a certain stability and a shared vision
of nationhood9  may also have been an incentive to
take a positive view of the efforts to agree on a fiscal
covenant: a position which was already evident months
before the elections in which the Guatemalan
Republican Front was victorious.10
9 Palencia (2002, pp. 79-97 and p. 63). See also Valdez (2003).
10 Although to the extent that there were “rational” expectations
of the FRG victory, these were already being internalized or
processed as part of the near future.
11 At that time, the Senate included nine senators designated by
the military regime, so that the votes of the Renovación Nacional
party were decisive for achieving a simple majority in this body.
12 The following account is based on Easter (2002).
Box 2
CHANGE IN THE CORRELATION OF FORCES AS A PREREQUISITE FOR A NEW FISCAL COVENANT
In the developed countries, the quasi-voluntary tax system has been subject to renegotiations, giving rise to
adjustments in the social covenants underlying fiscal policy which have been reflected in new or renewed fiscal
covenants. Thus, without going into details about the basic institutional framework and the advantages of having
a quasi-voluntary tax system, the history of those countries provides examples of what may be interpreted as new
or renewed fiscal covenants, as occurred in Sweden in 1938, the United Kingdom between 1939 and 1941 and
the United States in 1986 (Steinmo, 1993).
Each of these was triggered by some special event which altered the internal or external correlation of forces:
(i) the victory of the social democrat party in the Swedish elections in 1936, which gave rise to a pact negotiated
between management and labour – the basis for what was dubbed the “Swedish model”, which subsequently
became firmly entrenched; (ii) in the case of the United Kingdom, the Second World War, which called for a
special effort to mobilize resources to finance the armaments industry; and (iii) the electoral victory of Ronald
Reagan, combined with the substantiated reports that the tax burden of the major corporations in the United
States had gone down between 1981 and 1986.
The case of Chile, a developing country which has had a successful fiscal covenant since 1990, clearly
illustrates how fiscal policy is associated with the strengthening of democracy and how a new correlation of
forces contributes to such strengthening and to fiscal reform, giving rise to positive feedback between the two
processes. The event which triggered this initiative was the establishment of a new correlation of internal forces,
demonstrated initially by the rejection of the military dictatorship in the 1988 plebiscite and ratified in the 1989
elections with the victory of the centre-left forces (Christian Democrats, socialists and others) grouped together
in the Coalition for Democracy. This, together with a growing fiscal deficit and with promises to reduce the social
debt, led to the negotiation of a reform within its fledgling institutions, with a legislative power subject to
restrictions imposed by the military government,11  but with institutionally sound political parties, which were the
pivot of the tax reform negotiation negotiations.
In Poland, which also adopted a new fiscal covenant, a transition was initiated in 1989 with a government
supported by the Solidarity Movement, but with a legislature which, owing to the result of the 1991 elections,
was fragmented and virtually paralysed.12  With the institutional framework in a state of flux, the correlation of
forces shifted in favour of industrial, rural and public-sector workers, who resorted initially to protest action
–including strikes– in the face of the radical economic reforms introduced by the new government and in
opposition to a tax on wages above a certain level (the popiwek).
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The broad-based agreement on the Fiscal
Covenant included the URNG political party and a
number of social and labour organizations, which put
forward proposals on the issue, taking advantage of
the discreet and low-key support provided by
international cooperation agencies. As a whole, the
international community supported the negotiation
process, highlighting the importance of meeting the
12% tax target set out in the Peace Accords, although
the international finance institutions nevertheless
expressed reservations on the grounds that the
government might use the process as an excuse to
renege on its agreement to increase the tax burden.
Consequently, these institutions gave some technical
support but kept their distance, which had a positive
effect in the sense that it ensured genuine national
“ownership” of the project. Other sources of
cooperation helped actors from civil society –social
and academic organizations– to carry out studies and
make proposals, thus reducing the historical asymmetry
characteristic of fiscal policy management, which in
the past, had been restricted to government and
corporate actors.
Although the Preparatory Commission had
consulted the political parties during the preparation
of its proposal, and although the electoral platforms of
the parties included generic support for the idea of
establishing a fiscal covenant, not all the parties
supported it after its final negotiation –least of all the
Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) of the former
government, which subsequently went over to the
opposition. The political parties have always been
apprehensive about the political cost associated with
the taxes, and they were reluctant to accept or
understand the argument that the covenant allowed
this cost to be shared by all.
This attitude was influenced by the recognized
precariousness of the political party system in
Guatemala, characterized by fragmentation, a tendency
towards caudillism, inconsistency and limited
durability. Furthermore, there was a fundamental
strategic flaw in the negotiation phase of the fiscal
covenant, insofar as the effective participation of the
newly elected Congress was not assured, although
individual deputies did participate, including the
Chairman of the Finance Committee of Congress.13
This heralded what was perhaps the main weakness of
the new institutional framework for putting the fiscal
covenant into practice.
(b) Failure of the negotiations on the tax component
of the Fiscal Covenant
Since the principles and commitments contained
in the global agreement on the fiscal covenant were of
a more general nature, it was easier to reconcile the
different trade union and sectoral visions and to discuss
concrete measures, above all, the approval or
modification of taxes. The participants in the
subsequent negotiations on the tax reform, under the
auspices of the Monitoring Committee, were the social
organizations that made up the Collective of Social
Organizations (COS), the organized business sector,
represented by the Coordinating Committee of
Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial
Associations of Guatemala (CACIF), and the main
research centres: the National Economic Research
Centre (CIEN) and the Association for Social Research
and Studies (ASIES). The Monitoring Committee acted
as moderator and the United Nations Mission for the
Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with
the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement
on Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA) provided
active technical and facilitation support.
There were, however, two problems that
undermined this negotiation process. First, the
Ministry of Finance played only a secondary role in
the negotiations, partly because of apparent
disagreements within the government, due to the
reluctance of the latter to take part in the process because
of the Coordinating Committee’s disproportionate role
and because it denied the government the legitimacy
it had won through the elections. In practice, the
extreme weakness of the Executive, reflected in its
incapacity to coordinate positions on the issue,
prevented the consolidation of the new institutional
framework that was taking shape and was one of the
causes of the failure of this initiative. The negotiations
were more complex on this occasion, with
disagreements on the relative importance that direct
or indirect taxes should have and on the exemptions
that ought to be eliminated,14  giving rise to extreme
13 Congress was represented on the Monitoring Committee, but
this was not sufficient to ensure solid coordination with the
legislative power as a whole.
14 For the social sectors, the crucial issue was the increase in VAT,
which caused internal divisions even afterwards. The VAT
negotiations were contingent on an increase in the minimum wage,
while for the private sector, the negotiation of fiscal privileges and
direct taxation was the issue that aroused the strongest
confrontations with the social sectors (see Palencia, 2002).
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positions and setbacks that delayed the timely
presentation of the agreement to Congress. Even so, it
was possible to secure consensus on the Political
Agreement for Financing Peace, Development and
Democracy, which contained concrete measures for
achieving the tax burden target of 12%.15
Second, the inability of the Executive to
coordinate positions was compounded by the fact that
the majority party in the Congress (FRG) did not
welcome the new proposal that had been agreed, on
the grounds that the deputies had not participated in
the prior negotiation process, highlighting the fact that
Congress could only play a limited role as a mediating
and negotiating body at the highest political level.16
Paradoxically, the legislative body, and in particular
its president, General Ríos Montt, failed to take
advantage of the opportunity to adopt a significant
tax reform without major political costs, with increases
in the income tax and VAT rates already approved by the
private sector and the leading social organizations in
the country. Thus, they passed up an opportunity to
reach a genuine fiscal covenant.
(c) The return to the former institutional framework
(i) The return to confrontation. The government
and the party supporting it then decided to convene
new negotiations led by the Vice-President of the
Republic. These were a failure and even led to a
withdrawal to some previous positions, mainly on the
part of the social organizations, which then rejected
the increase in VAT. In that year, 2000, the Congress,
with the support of most of the deputies of the
government party, approved some of the reforms
included in the Political Agreement, but without
including the increase in VAT. This was done in a climate
15 In short, the agreement reached –known as the Political
Agreement– included: (i) strengthening of tax administration
and measures for combating tax evasion and smuggling; (ii) the
review of existing deductions and exemptions; (iii) an increase
in VAT from 10% to 12%; (iv) a rise in the maximum income tax
rate from 25% to 31%; (v) other tax measures, including an
increase in the tax on persons leaving the country, a new tax on
alcoholic beverages, a new property tax law and the conversion
of the temporary tax on assets into a permanent tax; (vi) an
increase in minimum wages; (vii) the implementation of an
economic reactivation programme; and (viii) the implementation
of a priority public spending programme.
16 At the same time that the Monitoring Committee was presenting
the Political Agreement to Congress, the Ministry of Finance was
presenting another proposal which excluded VAT and included a
tax on financial transactions, thus adding to the complexity of the
negotiation of the proposed reforms.
of growing confrontation with the private sector and
without the support of the social organizations and
the opposition parties in Congress.
Following the approval of the tax laws and in view
of the inadequacy of the measures applied, there was
still the threat that the VAT might be approved, subject
to divergences between Congress and the executive
power. When the private sector, the media and the
social organizations started to challenge the
government,17  the government strategy was revised.
The Minister of Public Finance was replaced and the
government adopted two measures: it raised the VAT
rate from 10% to 12%, as proposed in the previously
negotiated Political Agreement, and increased the rates
of the tax on assets and sales of commercial and
agricultural establishments (IEMA). The prevailing
climate was one of increasing polarization, and this
led the social organizations and the private sector as
well as the non-government parties to reject these
measures out of hand.
While the signing of the fiscal covenant was a
high point in the history of concerted action in
Guatemala, the rise in the VAT and IEMA rates in 2001
was one of the lowest points because of the degree of
confrontation that existed. This confrontation took on
different forms: mass demonstrations by the social
organizations, media campaigns against the
Government, a lockout in the private sector18  and
citizen protest campaigns, in which citizens wore
black, primarily as a rejection of the increase in VAT and
alleged government corruption. There was also a sharp
increase in the number of complaints of
unconstitutionality filed, which had not been the case
in 2000, when the Fiscal Covenant was signed, thus
showing the credibility of the negotiation of the
covenant. In 2001, in contrast, 41 complaints of
unconstitutionality were filed (31 by the business sector,
three by political parties and the remainder by civil
society); in 2002 nine were filed (five by the business
sector and four by civil society), and in 2003, 11 were
filed (six by the business sector and five by civil
society).
(ii) The return to a (broader) form of elite
negotiation. Following the victory of the Grand
17 Mainly because various cases of corruption and weak public
management had come to light.
18 In this case, the expressions of private-sector dissatisfaction
with the increase in VAT were due to the sector’s rejection of the
management of the government in power, rather than of the
tax itself.
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National Alliance (GANA) in the 2003 general elections,
the new government assumed a pro-business
orientation. Paradoxically, the persistent complaints
of unconstitutionality filed by the private sector in
previous years –especially the resulting declaration of
unconstitutionality of the tax on assets and sales (IEMA)
–generated a loss of tax revenue for the new government
which took office in 2004. During its first months in
office, the new government therefore decided that it
was necessary to modify the fiscal covenant in order to
cope with the crisis. To this end, the Executive formed
a Technical Committee on the Fiscal Covenant (CTPF),19
which was entrusted with the task of preparing a draft
tax reform.
This time, the consultation process was fairly
limited. On the one hand, the close relationship
between the Technical Committee and senior
government officials not linked to fiscal policy meant,
in view of the government’s pro-business stance, that
the business sector’s main concerns were taken into
account. On the other, the Committee’s technical
mandate helped to establish a belated but rapid process
of consultations with other sectors, without prior
consultation with the parties represented in Congress.
At all events, the Technical Committee’s proposal was
finally presented to the National Committee on the
Peace Accords (CNAP),20  and submitted by the latter
with minor amendments to the Congress of the Republic.
Various sectors argued that the consultations for
preparing the proposal were not sufficient to serve as a
basis for a fiscal covenant. The Congress of the
Republic, however, carried out an additional
consultation process, which took the form of public
hearings. This mechanism of democratic participation,
which had not been used in Guatemala, enabled the
Congress to listen to the views of different social,
academic, business and indigenous groups –something
which had not been done in the country in the last 50
years– and for a brief spell this series of hearings and
the fiscal debate it engendered were a breath of fresh
air for democracy in Guatemala which enabled the
country to go beyond confrontation or elite
negotiation.
In actual fact, however, Congress, which once again
had not been taken into account in the formulation of
the tax reform proposals and did not have the benefit
of specialized advice on tax issues, weakened even
further the proposals made by the Technical
Committee. This was partly due to complaints by social
organizations (which had not been included in a broad-
based consultation process), whose positions reflected
urban middle-class interests which coincided with the
private sector’s concern that income tax should not be
any higher.
The reforms to the tax laws were only approved
once there was understanding between the different
groups in Congress. The approved initiatives were four
in number: (i) changes in income tax, whereby a
streamlined payment regime providing for a tax of 5%
on gross income was introduced in place of the 31%
rate; (ii) the creation of a special temporary tax in
support of the Peace Accords (IETAAP): a tax on assets
and sales, similar to the IEMA, but with lower rates and
established on a temporary basis, in keeping with the
position of CACIF; (iii) a tax on alcoholic beverages,
which was not in force because it had been declared
unconstitutional; and (iv) authorization to increase the
central government debt.
Two features of this reform should be highlighted.
First, it introduced only minor amendments that
reflected the existence of an elite negotiation between
the government and CACIF, with the legislative power
playing a weak mediatory role and agreeing to
measures of simplification or of a low impact, with a
temporary component in terms of direct taxation, all
of which was consistent with the Guatemalan private
sector’s traditional approach to taxation. Second, the
incomplete approval of the reforms only generated half
the funds that the original reform would have obtained.
In fact, the reform that was finally adopted was
insufficient even to make up for the income lost
because of the complaints of unconstitutionality, so
that the tax burden was maintained at 10.3% in 2004:
equivalent to the 2003 level, but lower than in 2002
(10.6%). When fiscal policy is analysed in full, however,
there are some other advances which should be
recognized, including the (recent) strengthening of tax
administration21  and a greater degree of transparency
19 Which replaced the Monitoring Committee on the Fiscal
Covenant.
20 This body replaced the Monitoring Committee on Fulfilment
of the Peace Accords (CAAP).
21 Moreover, despite the fact that the Office of the
Superintendent of Tax Administration (SAT) was conceived as
an autonomous and technical entity, the continuous turnover
of authorities (five superintendents in eight years of existence)
has made it difficult to develop long-term policies. In addition,
the transparency of the entity was strongly affected in the year
2003, when the former Comptroller of Accounts (who was
later prosecuted for unlawful enrichment) was appointed
director of this entity.
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of public expenditure. The most important and
intractable problem remains unsolved, however: the
insufficiency of tax revenues.
In short, the signing of the Fiscal Covenant in 2000
did not give rise to a new institutional framework
permitting tax reforms to establish a solid and sustainable
tax base in the country, with quasi-voluntary compliance
with tax obligations. Reform processes continued to be
pursued but, like those that had predominated in
previous decades, they were based on confrontation or
conceived as a partly cosmetic elite negotiation with
little real impact.
Mention should be made, however, of two
important changes which took place in the phase
following the Fiscal Covenant and could facilitate
future negotiations. First, notwithstanding the policy
of broad-based alliances, and in spite of doing whatever
had to be done to exercise its power of veto, CACIF was
unable to prevent the tax reforms imposed by the
government of the Guatemala Republican Front (FRG)
in 2001 and 2002, and the “success” of complaints of
unconstitutionality filed by CACIF prompted a new and
incomplete tax reform, now put forward by a
government favourable to the business sector. In other
words, CACIF ceased, at least temporarily, to have the
power of veto. In addition, the weaker position in which
it found itself, together with the less rigid stance of
some of its representatives, led it to adopt a more
flexible institutional position.
Second, and partly linked to the above, it is
important to recognize the incipient but ever-
increasing role played by Congress in determining the
country’s fiscal policy, as well as the more marked
participation of social organizations in the generation
of proposals and in monitoring fiscal policy. This has
meant that the strategy of elite negotiation of 2004
had to be expanded, albeit belatedly and only partially,
to take other actors into account.
TABLE 2
Guatemala: Tax reforms and their outcome following the Agreement
on the Fiscal Covenant, 2000-2004
Government and Government Instruments Outcome Variation in
year of reform proposals for action tax burden
Alfonso Portillo (2001) 1.2%
(between 2000 and 2002)
Repeal of IEMA and other taxes
represented a 1.6% variation
Oscar Berger (2004)
Cases of elite negotiation
Replacement of the tax on sales
and assets




Public protests by social
organizations regarding VAT
and income tax on wages
Alfonso Portillo (2000) Increase of VATa to 12%
Increase in ITb
Reduction in the extent to which
VAT payments can be set off
against income tax
Elimination of exemptions and
deductions
Modification of specific taxes
(on tobacco, cement, beverages)
Increase of VAT to 12%
Increase of rate of IEMAc
Increase in the rate of specific
taxes (alcoholic beverages)
Reduction of exemptions and
deductions
Negotiation, except with respect





Filing of complaints of
unconstitutionality
Media campaigns against the
government.
Public protests by social
organizations
Adoption of reforms on
exemptions and deductions
and specific taxes
Increase in income tax
Adoption of all the reforms
Reforms in IEMA, income




(between 1999 and 2001)
Cases of confrontation
Adoption of reform, but
without
modifications in VAT and
income tax on wages
Reduction of rate and
period of application of
tax on sales and assets
Estimated temporary impact,
1.0%
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Ministry of Public Finance.
aVAT: value added tax.
bIT: income tax.
cIEMA: tax on commercial and agricultural establishments.
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To sum up, there is room for some degree of
optimism. Both the more moderate positions adopted
by CACIF in the recent past and the increased
participation by social organizations and Congress in
forging fiscal policy point to the possibility of a new
institutional and negotiating framework in the future,
with Congress assuming a more central and responsible
role, which could give rise to agreed tax reforms based
on quasi-voluntary compliance by Guatemalan
citizens with their tax obligations in the future. Whether
this materializes will depend largely on the
strengthening of the political parties, especially those
with the capacity to shape a vision of the State for the
medium and long term and the will to implement it.
III
Conclusions:
Ten keys to a successful Fiscal Covenant
The foregoing has various implications for future
actions by Guatemala or other countries in terms of
fiscal policy. On the one hand, there should be clear
differentiation between an isolated tax reform which
may well lack any solid social or political basis and a
social pact on fiscal policy. Fiscal covenants normally
include long-term tax reforms that mark the country
and its fiscal policy for a long time to come, based as
they are on agreements which have been negotiated
within the framework of the democratic institutions of
the country and which have broad political and social
support.22  On the other hand, once a participatory
process has been firmly established for reforming and
strengthening the institutional framework in which the
fiscal policy aimed at guaranteeing an effective social
pact) is defined, the experiences of fiscal covenants in
Guatemala and other countries suggest the following
recommendations:
(i) Take advantage of the opportunities provided
by changes in the correlation of internal forces in order
to promote a social pact on fiscal policy.
(ii) Have an organization or well-defined
institutional arrangement for driving forward the
process and ensure that it is technically and politically
credible and represents the main sectors involved in
the negotiation of the social pact on fiscal policy.
(iii) From the outset, include the political parties
and legislative power in the negotiation process,
bearing in mind that the sought-for institutional change
seeks to democratize the definition of fiscal policy and
that this is contingent on the decisive incorporation of
the parties and the legislative power as fundamental
components of a democratic regime.
(iv) Base the process on a holistic and long-term
approach which can expand the number of issues subject
to concessions –without limiting it exclusively to the
question of taxation– in order to facilitate agreements.
The negotiation of a fiscal covenant should not be
interpreted as a process aimed at achieving a short-term
tax reform, but as a starting point for a lasting reform of
the State, which, based on a change in the correlation of
forces, will guide public policy in the future.
(v) Define a well-defined and clear strategy of
consultations that not only ensures that the different
interests are taken into account but also confers
legitimacy on the process and explains its potential
components.
(vi) Establish a positive relationship with the
media so that they will support the process.
(vii) Disseminate information and studies on the issue,
thereby contributing to a collective learning process
which can facilitate convergence among positions and
the development of a common “language”, which will be
conducive to agreements. Serious and accurate statistics
are part of such a “language”.
(viii) Use flexible negotiation techniques, bearing
in mind the past experience of the country in question.
(ix) Compensate for the unequal bargaining power
of different sectors by giving the weaker groups more
access to information and by improving their technical
and bargaining capacity.
(x) Allocate sufficient time for capacity-building
and negotiation in order to achieve the desired results.
(Original: Spanish)
22 Merriam (2004) makes a very clear distinction between these
two aspects in an analysis of the Fiscal Covenant in Guatemala.
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